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Balancing a Citizen's Right to Know with the Privacy of
an Innocent Family: The Expansion of the Scope of
Exemption 7(C) of The Freedom of Information Act
under National Archives & Records Administration v.
Favish.
By Lauren Bemis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suicide or murder? Government conspiracy or one man's
decision to take his own life? These questions surrounded the United
States Government's investigation of the death of Vincent Foster, Jr.,
White House deputy counsel. But one man's interest in the
circumstances surrounding Foster's death took him to the United
States Supreme Court. A unanimous court denied his request for
autopsy photographs of Foster, a request that he made under the
Freedom of Information Act. The Court ultimately held that the
privacy interests of Foster's family greatly outweighed any public
interest Favish was attempting to advance by obtaining the
photographs.
Law enforcement records, such as photographs from a crime
scene, are available for public scrutiny under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), unless the government can prove that
disclosure of the photographs would reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.' More specifically,
Exemption 7(C) of FOIA was drafted to protect against precisely this
interest: to effectively ensure that there be no disclosure of law
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A.
Political Communication, 2003, George Washington University. I would like to
thank my parents for their support and encouragement during law school.
1. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996), amended by Pub. L.
No. 104-231 (1996).
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enforcement records that would constitute an unwarranted privacy
invasion. 2
Exemption 7(C) has taken a bumpy ride in the courts. Some
circuits have placed no requirements on the requestor to explain why
the documents were asked for, while others have required the
requestor to show that access to this information will advance the
public interest. Some courts have required knowledge of the
requestor's identity, while others have not. After the Supreme
Court's ruling in National Archives & Records Administration v.
Favish, a new bright-line test was established, placing a greater
burden on the requestor to show how the disclosure of the
information will advance the public interest. 3
When the FOIA was first drafted, the congressional intent behind
the statute was to provide a vehicle for private citizens to gather
information in order to more closely scrutinize the government.
FOIA's purpose was to be a full-disclosure statute, and the burden
was placed on the agency to show that certain pieces of information
should not be released. Despite being a full-disclosure statute, some
materials were never intended for public dissemination. Therefore,
Congress enacted nine exemptions to give agencies the power to
withhold sensitive materials. Exemption 7(C) was specifically
created so agencies could withhold law enforcement documents.
However, when a court was faced with the decision of whether
families were afforded the same protections as the subject of those
documents who had deceased there was no rule or statutory guidance.
However, National Archives changed the way Exemption 7(C) is
interpreted, and has turned Exemption 7(C) into a withholding
statute.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Purpose of the Freedom of Information Act is to "pierce the
veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light
of public scrutiny. "4 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was
enacted by the government to provide full disclosure of government
2. Id.
3. Nat'l. Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
4. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v.
Dep't of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
aactivities to private citizens.5 In 1966, Congress passed FOIA to
allow access to information concerning the government's inner-
workings. 6 In other words, the FOIA was intended to be a "full
disclosure statute."
7
FOIA, now part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was
drafted to revise Section Three of the APA; Section Three was
regarded as a withholding statute rather than a disclosure statute.
8
The language in the statute was littered with vague phrases, such as
an exempted disclosure of "any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest. '" 9 Additionally, "matters of
official record" were accessible only to those "persons properly and
directly concerned" with the information.' 0  FOIA's statutory
construction eliminates the "persons properly and directly concerned"
test and replaces it with the language of "to the public" and "for
public inspection."' 1 Nine exemptions in subsection (b) of FOIA set
out specific situations where the government may elect to not
disclose certain pieces of information.' 2  These nine exemptions
provide agencies with a more concrete and efficient manner to decide
whether materials should be made available or not. If the party
requesting the information is denied access, that person may appeal
to the judicial system and have his case reviewed de novo. 13
Congress' intent behind FOIA was to allow private citizens the
opportunity to request and access information necessary to ensure
that the government was legitimately carrying out its functions.' 4
5. Laurie A. Doherty, The D.C. Circuit Review: The Freedom of Information
Act, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 880 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 80. "Subsection (b) is part of this scheme and represents the
congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch
must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses." Id.
13. Id. "[FOIA] seeks to permit access to official information long shielded
unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable
public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands." Id.
14. See Doherty, supra note 5, at 880.
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Before FOIA's enactment, the government had no system by which a
citizen could request information; rather, all information was
protected and inaccessible.' 5 Thus, when drafting this legislation,
Congress was aware of the need to protect certain types of materials;
as such, it balanced open access to government activity and
protection of confidential material.16
At the same time that a broad philosophy of "freedom
of information" is enacted into law, it is necessary to
protect certain equally important rights of privacy
with respect to certain information in government
files, such as medical and personnel records. It is also
necessary for the very operation of our government to
allow it to keep confidential certain material, such as
the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 17
A central principle of FOIA was to release only that information
that served a public purpose.' 8 The typical situation involves a
private requestor that asks for documents from the agency holding
them.' 9 The agency then has the choice to turn over the documents
or to invoke one of the nine exemptions."0 The burden rests on the
government to show that the retention of the documents is in fact
protected by one of the nine exemptions.2' If the documents are
withheld, the party may file suit in court to have the documents
15. Id.
16. Id. This paper focuses on exemption 7(C) and will briefly discuss
exemption 6, but will not discuss the other exemptions.
17. See EPA, 410 U.S. at 80 n.6 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813 at 3 (1965)).
18. James T. O'Reilly, Expanding the Purpose of Federal Records Access:
New Private Entitlement or New Threat to Privacy?, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 371, 372
(1998).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. James 0. Pearson, Jr., What Constitutes "Unwarranted Invasion of
Personal Privacy" for Purposes of Law Enforcement Investigatory Records
Exemption of Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. §552(b)(7)(C)), 52 A.L.R.
FED. 181, §2(a) (2004).
turned over.2 2 In that situation, the court would employ a de novo
standard of review. 23
A. Exemptions under FOIA: 7(C)
The exemptions under FOIA provide a shield of privacy for two
distinct groups: the governmental agencies and the people who are
the subject of the documents. Under FOIA, the agencies are not
required to release certain pieces of information if they fall within
one of the nine exemptions.24 Specifically, Exemption 7(C) of FOIA
provides for the protection of law enforcement records from
unwarranted invasions of privacy: "This section does not apply to
matters that are . . records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of
such law enforcement records or information could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. 25
However, the courts have not set out a bright-line rule defining
what is protected under 7(C) and what is not. Typically, any report
compiled by a law enforcement agency is examined under this
exemption. Case law has examined reports compiled by the Internal
Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Watergate Special
Prosecuting Force, the National Park Service, and the Office of
Independent Council. 26 To determine which records are exempt from
disclosure under FOIA, the Court has employed a balancing test; the
public interest in disclosure is balanced against the private interest in
withholding the information.27 Exemption 7(C) not only provides
protection to the source of the information, but also to third parties of
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See § 522(b)(7)(C).
25. Id.
26. See Pearson, 52 A.L.R. 181 at *2a; see also Nat'lArchives, 541 U.S. at
161.
27. Pearson, supra note 21. When using this balancing test, the courts have
generally found that disclosure of material in investigative reports constitutes an
unwarranted invasion of privacy when that report was compiled by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, or the Watergate Special
Prosecuting Force. Id.
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that source if disclosure of information constitutes an unwarranted
privacy invasion as to that third party. 28 In addition, Exemption 7(C)
affords protection to the person whose information was in the files,
along with others who could be hurt from the release of those files,
such as family members. 29 Under Exemption 7(c), the agency will
only release files that compromise a privacy interest if the requestor
can show that there is a greater overriding interest in the public
release of the documents. It is insufficient that the requestor has a
personal or pecuniary interest in the disclosure. 30
When a court faces a FOIA Exemption 7(C) case, it utilizes the
balancing test set forth above: weighing the public interest in
disclosure versus the privacy interest of the subject of the documents.
The balancing process involves various criteria and, in making a
determination, the court considers the information at issue. If there
are other means available to request or obtain the information, for
instance, then it is possible that the information does not hold an
overriding privacy interest because of its availability elsewhere.
3 1
The court may also consider the extent to which the disclosure
includes the public's interest in the oversight of government
functions.
32
B. The Personal Privacy Exemptions under FOIA
Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 under FOIA are both
considered personal privacy exemptions under FOIA.33 Like 7(C),
Exemption 6 provides a privacy right, but deals specifically with the
disclosure of personnel, medical, and other similar files.
34
28. Id. (citing Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917 (3rd Cir.
1981)).
29. Id.
30. Id. "[P]rivate, personal, or pecuniary interests of a requester is not
enough." King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1983).
31. Pearson, supra note 21.
32. Id.
33. Doherty, supra note 5, at 893.
34. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1996). Documents which may be
withheld from disclosure include "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." Id.
Interestingly, the language of Exemption 6 provides that the
disclosure must constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." 35 Exemption 7(C) refers only to disclosures that
"could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy. '"36 Despite the differing language in the two
statutes the same balancing test is applied under both exemptions:
weighing the public interest against the privacy rights of the
individual.37 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted that
Exemption 6 is afforded stricter standards of scrutiny because of the
use of the word "clearly."38
C. Department of the Air Force v. Rose
The 1976 case Department of the Air Force v. Rose set forth the
standards to determine whether the invasion of privacy is
unwarranted under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).39  In Rose, the
respondents were student editors and former editors of New York
University Law Review conducting research for an article on
disciplinary systems in the military.4" They requested information
from the Air Force Academy Honor Board on case summaries of
honor and ethics hearings with personal references or other personal
information that could be deleted so as to protect the identity of the
cadets.4 ' However, the Air Force Academy Honor Board denied the
requests.42
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (emphasis added); see also Doherty, supra
note 5, at 893.
37. Doherty, supra note 5, at 893 n.107.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 893.
40. Dep 't ofAir Force, 425 U.S. at 354-55.
41. Id. at 355. The documents requested summarized cadet breaches of the
Honor Code at the academy. Id. at 358. The code states "[w]e will not lie, steal, or
cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does." Id. at 358-59. An Honor
Committee is charged with carrying out disciplinary actions if anyone violates this
code. Id. at 359. Suspected violations are reported to the committee chairman; the
chairman then appoints a three-cadet investigatory team with help from a legal
advisor. Id. If this team determines that a hearing is warranted, the alleged violator
appears before an honor board of eight cadets. Id. The accused may present
witnesses to testify on his behalf. Id. The board may only return a guilty verdict if
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Respondents then brought an action under the FOIA to have the
Air Force Academy Honor Board release the requested information.
43
The district court granted the Agency's motion for summary
judgment.44 The respondents appealed the decision to the Second
Circuit, which reversed the district court.45  The Agency tried to
argue that the documents fell within Exemption 6 of the FOIA - that
the files were medical, personnel, or similar, and their disclosure
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
46
Although the Second Circuit agreed that it is possible for the case
summaries to fall within Exemption 6, it refused to simply compel
the Agency to turn over all the documents or deny the respondents
any of the case summaries under Exemption 6."7 Instead, the court
the vote is unanimous. Id. The guilty verdict can be with or without discretion;
"with discretion" means that the cadet still has good standing, while without
discretion means the cadet may have to resign from the academy, request a hearing
before a board of officers, or request a trial by court-martial. Id. From these
hearings, the Committee prepares a one-page case summary with the relevant facts.
Id. It was normal practice for the academy to post copies of these summaries on
forty squadron bulletin boards throughout the academy and to distribute the same to
academy officials and faculty. Id. at 355.
42. Id. However, the Air Force Honor's Board did release official copies of
the Honor Code, the Honor Reference Manual, and other materials explaining the
relevant ethic and honor code. Id. at 352 n.2. The board denied release of the case
summaries because '[s]ome cases may be recognized by the reader by the
circumstances alone without the identity of the cadet given' and '[t]here is no way
of determining just how these facts will be or could be used."' Id.
43. Id. at 356. The respondents brought the action under 5 U.S.C. § 552, as
amended in 1974. Id.
44. Id. The district court did not require the Air Force to first produce the case
summaries for inspection. Id. at 357. The judge held that even with the deletions
of personal references, the documents fell under Exemption 2 of the statute -
"matters . . . related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency." Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
45. Dep't ofAir Force, 425 U.S. at 357. The Second Circuit disagreed with the
district court and held that the case summaries do not fall within Exemption 2. Id.
46. Id., see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The district court found this exemption to be
inapplicable, however, because.., that disclosure of the summaries without names
or other identifying information would not subject any former cadet to public
identification and stigma, and the possibility of identification by another former
cadet could not, in the context of the Academy's practice of distribution and official
posting of the summaries, constitute an invasion of personal privacy .... Dep't of
Air Force, 425 U.S. at 357.
47. Dep't ofAir Force, 425 U.S. at 357.
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found that the Agency had not met its burden at the district court
level of showing that all of the case summaries were protected, since
the Agency never produced the documents for inspection.48 The
Agency was now required to produce the case summaries for an in
camera inspection.49 The Agency appealed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.50
The Supreme Court focused on the legislative history of the
FOIA to make its determination about the release of these case
summaries. The Court found itself asking, under Exemption 6,
"whether the clause 'the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' modifies
'personnel and medical files' or only 'similar files."''5 1 The Agency
argued that all personnel files should be excluded under Exemption
6, but similar files should only be excluded when their disclosure
constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.5 2
However, the Agency only made this argument to the Supreme Court
and not in the district court or court of appeals. 53 The Supreme Court
therefore found that there is no exception under Exemption 6 for
personnel files only, nor any indication in the legislative history that
personnel files should always be exempt. 4
The Court relied on the Congressional and Senate Reports to
determine the meaning of Exemption 6. The House Report stated,
"[t]he limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy' provides a proper balance between the protection of an
individual's right of privacy and the preservation of the public's right
to Government information by excluding those kinds of files the
disclosure of which might harm the individual. '5 5 The Senate Report
48. Id.
49. Id. at 358. "'We think it highly likely that the combined skills of the court
and Agency, applied to the summaries, will yield edited documents sufficient for
the purpose sought and sufficient as well to safeguard affected persons in their
legitimate claims of privacy." Id. (quoting Rose v. Dep't of Air Force, 495 F.2d
261, 268 (2d Cir. 1974)).
50. Dep't ofAir Force, 425 U.S. at 358.
51. Id. at 370.
52. Id. at 371.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 372 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966)).
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similarly stated, "[t]he phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of
interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from
unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right
to governmental information." 56 After comparing both statements,
the Supreme Court held that there was clearly no congressional intent
to separate personnel and similar files; rather Congress was
enumerating a single policy to be enforced judicially by balancing
private and public interests.5 7
The Supreme Court also noted that Exemption 7(C), the other
personal privacy exemption under the FOIA, underwent changes
during the amendment process in 1974.58 The same "clearly
unwarranted" language used in Exemption 6 was inserted into
Exemption 7(C). 59  At the request of the President, however,
Exemption 7(C) was amended again and "clearly" was dropped from
the language of Exemption 7(C).60 However, despite the differing
language in the two exemptions, the protections of the Exemption 6
still apply to Exemption 7(C). 61 Thus, the same test - "balancing of
the individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the basic
purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency action to
the light of public scrutiny"' - should be applied to both Exemptions 6
and 7(C).62 The agency must, "before releasing any information that
might involve an invasion of personal privacy ... weigh the public
56. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965)).
57. Id. at 373. The Senate Report states as to this balancing test:
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is
not an impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude that
to protect one of the interests, the other must of necessity, either
be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies in
providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest
responsible disclosure.
Id. at 373 n.9 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3).
58. Id. at 380 n.16.
59 Id.
60. Id.; see also Doherty, supra note 5, at 893 n.107.
61. See Doherty, supra note 5, at 893 n.107 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 17,033
(1974) (statement by Sen. Hart)).
62. Dep't of Air Force, 425 U.S. at 372-74; see also Doherty, supra note 5, at
interest in disclosure of the information against the privacy interest in
protecting such information from disclosure."
63
The courts were then faced with another issue under Exemption
7(C): that of how to balance the public and private interests when
faced with disclosing publicly available information to a third party.
64
D. U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
In Reporters Committee, a CBS news correspondent and the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, requested information
about the criminal records of four family members of the Medico
family.65 Specifically, the respondents were interested in obtaining
the rap sheets of the four members. 66 The FBI initially denied the
requests, however, upon the death of three of the Medico's, the FBI
handed over the rap sheets but failed to turn over Charles Medico's
(Medico) rap sheets.67 Reporters Committee brought an action under
the FOIA claiming that the information in the Medico rap sheet
contained "matters of public record., 68
At the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Department of Justice
argued that the rap sheets fell under Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA,
and therefore were not subject to disclosure because they contained
sensitive information. 69 The majority, using legislative history as its
guide, first made a determination on whether the FOIA exemptions
were targeted at all information or information not yet within the
63. Doherty, supra note 5, at 893-94.
64. See id.
65. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 785 (1989). The Medico family ran a legitimate business called Medico
Industries, as reported by the Pennsylvania Crime Commissions, but that business
was dominated by organized crime figures. Id. It was also reported that this
company obtained defense contracts through improper negotiations with a corrupt
congressman. Id.
66. Id. Rap sheets are criminal identification records created by the FBI, that
contain information like date of birth, physical characteristics, dates of arrests,
charges, and convictions. Id. at 751.
67. Id. at 757.
68. Id.
69. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d
730, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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public domain.70 The court initially determined that based on a 1965
Senate Report examining the language of Exemption 6, "the phrase
'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy
that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an
individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny and the
preservation of the public's right to governmental information."
7
'
Thus, it appears that Congress did not intend to require documents
that were already made public to be inaccessible under Exemption
7(C).72 The court rejected the Agency's argument that although
information within the rap sheets had been made public, the rap sheet
is still afforded protection under Exemption 7(C).73 The court relied
on two Supreme Court cases for support: Department of State v.
Washington Post Co. and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.
7 4
Quoting from Department of State. Quoting the decision in Dep 't of
State, the court explained that:
[W]here information is "a matter of public record," for
example, "past criminal convictions," the public nature
of [the] information may be a reason to conclude, under
all the circumstances of a given case, that the release of
such information would not constitute a 'clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [under
Exemption 6] ....
The court, quoting Cox Broadcasting, further explained that
"[t]he prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that
the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already
70. Id. at 738.
71. Id. at 739-40 (quoting REP. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965)) (emphasis omitted).
Making the same connection as the Supreme Court in Rose, the D.C. Circuit Court
recognized that it was Congress' intent to use the Exemption 6 analysis in
Exemption 7(C). Id. at 739 n. 11.
72. Id. at 738.
73. Id. at 739.
74. Id.; U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
75. Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 739 (quoting Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at
602-03 n.5).
appears on the public record. ' 7 6 Therefore the Circuit Court made
the determination that once a matter is of public record, privacy
interests are lessened but not completely eliminated. 17 This now
requires, however, the threshold inquiry under Exemption 7(C) as to
whether the information is a matter of public record. 78
The court defined a public record as "mean[ing] that a local, state
or federal political body has made an affirmative determination that
criminal records must be freely available to the general public and
has provided a mechanism to ensure the implementation of that
policy. ' 79 If a law enforcement body only provides the information
to certain agencies and not the public at large, then the information
would not be considered a matter of public record.80 Accordingly,
the majority opinion held in Cox that once it is established that the
matter is of public record, then there is a presumption of public
interest in that record.8' Thus, once the presumption of public
interest is established, there need be no further inquiry as to the
degree of public interest since the privacy interest is so substantially
diminished.82 Thus the district court erred in first establishing
whether the rap sheets were made publicly available. 83
Judge Kenneth W. Starr wrote a concurring opinion in which he
disagreed with the majority's decision to set aside the balancing test
in favor of a single factor test that would only look at the public
interest in disclosure.84 Under the majority's holding, he argued, the
court will no longer review FOIA cases de novo as instructed by
Congress. 85  Rather, the court deferred to the legislative
76. Id. at 740 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U.S. at 494-95) (emphasis
in original).
77. Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 740.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 740.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 740-4 1; see also Doherty, supra note 5, at 898.
82. Doherty, supra note 5, at 898.
83. Id. at 896.
84. Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 743 (Starr, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 744.
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determination of what is and what is not public record.86 Judge Starr
also cautioned that by rejecting the balancing test and placing the
single factor test in its place, in future cases the court will be forced
to overlook other factors that should be considered when assessing
the general public interest, such as the nature of the crime and when
the crime or arrest occurred.87 Judge Starr also criticized the majority
for abandoning the notion that the request's reasoning should be
considered.88 He argued the majority used the statement in FBI v.
Abrahamson, "Congress did not differentiate between the purposes
for which information was requested," to mean that the purpose of
the request should never be considered.89 But under Abrahamson,
the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the request was only
irrelevant after the private and public interest had been balanced. 90
Judge Starr further argued that the majority read the line out of
context and that the statement that Congress does not differentiate
between purposes was meant to apply to a later phase of the
Exemption 7(C) balancing test.9' Rather, the purpose of the request
should always be one of the factors used in the balancing test.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Reporters
Committee and reversed the Circuit Court's decision. The Court first
determined that although parts of the rap sheets may have been
public at one point, that does not mean that the individual who is the
source of the rap sheet has lost their privacy interest. 92 Rather, the
Court steered in the opposite direction of the Court of Appeals:
86. Id. "[T]he majority decides to go AWOL, as it were, by failing entirely to
heed Congress' directive. Instead of de novo balancing, the court's 'analysis' is
reduced to deferential rubber-stamping." Id.
87. Id. at 745.
88. Id. In the context of this case, the fact that the records are sought by
representatives of the media for the avowed purpose of exposing the possible
misuse of government funds -- rather than by some idiosyncratic individual seeking
to satisfy a mere curiosity about criminal records -- should be a factor in the public-
interest determination. Id.
89. Id.
90. Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d at 746 (Starr, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 767 (1989). "State policies ...provide evidence that the law enforcement
profession generally assumes ... that individual subjects have a significant privacy
The privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The
substantial character of that interest is affected by the
fact that in today's society the computer can
accumulate and store information that would
otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a
person attains age 80, when the FBI's rap sheets are
discarded.93
Returning to its decision in Rose, the Court reiterated that
although documents may have been public at one time, the subject of
those documents still maintains a privacy interest in nondisclosure. 94
In order to maintain the privacy interest of the individual, the Court
stressed that the FOIA has a segregability element. 95  Once
identifying material is deleted from the documents, the documents
may be made available to the court for an in camera inspection to
determine whether that disclosure would constitute an invasion of
privacy. 9
6
The Court next discussed when a privacy invasion is
unwarranted.97 The Court rejected Judge Starr's argument that the
purpose of the request should be considered. Instead, returning to the
fundamental principles behind the FOIA, the Court underscored
Congress's intent "'to give any member of the public as much right to
disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular
document]."' 98  The test of whether the invasion is unwarranted
"turn[s] on the nature of the requested document and its relationship
in their criminal histories. It is reasonable to presume that Congress legislated with
an understanding of this professional point of view." Id.
93. Id. at 771.
94. Id. at 767-68. The Court notes that though Rose dealt with Exemption 6
"personnel and medical files," the same analysis is applicable to Exemption 7(C).
Id. The documents referred to by the Court were the case summaries of the cadets
that were made public to other students and faculty of the Air Force Academy. Id.
95. Id. at 768.
96. Id. "[T]he FOIA permits release of a segregable portion of a record with
other portions deleted, and that in camera inspection was proper to determine
whether parts of the record could be released while keeping other parts secret." Id.
at 768.
97. Id. at 771.
98. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 123, 149 (1975)).
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to" the purpose of the FOIA.99 Therefore, if the document is one
which may be disclosed, the requestor must have a public purpose by
using the information to check government action. This, however, is
where the Reporters Committee lost their case. Because it sought a
private individual's rap sheet, wanting the document to expose a
mobster, and not the inner-workings of the government, they failed
the unwarranted invasion of the privacy test. 00
The Court then developed a bright line test for Exemption 7(C) to
aide the lower courts in balancing the public interest in disclosure
against the interest the Exemption was designed to protect.
Departing from past decisions, the Court adopted a categorical
approach by rejecting the notion that every FOIA exemption case
should be examined on a case-by-case basis.101 A court's decision
may now be "appropriate" once a case fits into a "genus" where the
balance generally tips in one direction; the court may ignore other
circumstances surrounding that case. 0 2  Thus for an "appropriate
class of law enforcement records or information a categorical balance
may be undertaken ... 103
E. The Central Purpose Doctrine
The impact of the Supreme Court's opinion in Reporters
Committee left the lower courts with guiding principles to follow.
These guidelines are known as the "central purpose" doctrine, though
the Supreme Court never formally named the guidelines. 4 The
analysis of the public interest in Reporters Committee yielded to this
standard.'0 5 While the plaintiffs - the reporters and media - argued
that there was a substantial interest in the past criminal history of
99. Id. at 772.
100. Id. at 775. "There is, unquestionably, some public interest in providing
interested citizens with answers to their questions about Medico. But that interest
falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve."
Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 776.
102 • Id.
103. Id. at 777.
104. Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public
Information Law, 45 DUKE L.J. 1249, 1255 (1996).
105. Id. at 1257.
Medico, the Court agreed that in fact there was some public interest
in the disclosure of this material. 106 But the Court held that FOIA
was not the appropriate vehicle in which to obtain the rap sheet.
10 7
Rather the "central purpose" behind the FOIA is to ensure that the
government is open for public scrutiny; not for parties to gather
personal information about a third party.' 1 8
The central purpose doctrine in essence is a means to an end,
rather than just an end.10 9 The FOIA simply provides the tools by
which a citizen can gain access to information about the government.
The Court has said before that the "touchstone" of the FOIA is "good
government," not "freedom of information." 10
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the central purpose doctrine
with two cases: U.S. Department of State v. Ray and U.S.
Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority."'
1. U.S. Department of State v. Ray
The Ray case dealt with Exemption 6, and extended the central
purpose doctrine to this Exemption.' 12 In this case, a Florida lawyer
requested under FOIA interviews with Haitian refugees taken at
sea. 113  The Court held that the same balancing test used for
Exemption 7(C) is necessary for Exemption 6. "[Exemption 6]
requires the Court to balance 'the individual's right to privacy'
against the basic policy of opening 'agency action to the light of
public scrutiny."""' Using this test, the Court said that a great public
interest existed in seeing if the State Department had been monitoring
the Haitian government to ensure that it was in compliance with its
106. Id.
107. Id. The purpose for which the media sought the rap sheets was "outside
the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve." Id. (quoting
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774).
108. Beall, supra note 104, at 1255.
109. Id. at 1258.
110. Id.
111. U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); U.S. Dep't of Def. v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
112. Ray, 502 U.S. at 166; see also Beall, supra note 104, at 1258-59.
113. Ray, 502 U.S. at 168.
114. Id. at 175 (citing Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
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promise to not prosecute returnees.t 15  However, the Court only
allowed the release of redacted interview summaries because that
was in accordance with the central purpose of the FOIA. "6 Similar
to Rose, the Court required that all identifying information be
removed or deleted." 7  The Court rejected Ray's argument that
deleting the identifying information would hinder his investigation
into whether or not the Haitian government was keeping its word."'
2. U.S. Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
When the Supreme Court heard U.S. Department of Defense v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority, it explicitly stated for the first
time that the public interest test could now only be satisfied under the
central purpose of the FOIA. 119 This case involved FOIA requests
for home addresses of civilian, non-union workers at military
bases. 120 The requestors were unions and bargaining units that
wanted the information to facilitate collective bargaining for these
civilians. 12' Though the unions argued for the derivative use theory,
the Court did not accept that theory. 22 Rather, the Court held that
the names and addresses did not serve the public interest under
derivative use by showing what the government had been up to.123
Therefore the unions failed the central purpose doctrine and were
denied access to the information. 
124
115. Id. at 177-78.
116. Id.
117. Id. 178-79.
118. Id.; see also Beall, supra note 104, at 1259.
119. U.S. Dep't of Def v. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495-96
(1994).
120. Id. at 489-90.
121. Id. at 497-98.
122. Id. The Derivate Use Theory purports that "the information is valuable
not just for its own sake but also because it may be used to discover, or 'derive'
additional information." Beall, supra note 104, at n.38. The Court rejected this
theory in Ray because releasing the information with the names in it served only a
"hypothetical" public interest. Id. See also supra notes 106-12.
123. U.S. Dep't ofDef, 510 U.S. at 497.
124. Id. at 503. See also Beall, supra note 104, at 1260-61.
This holding created an unforeseen burden on a requestor of
information. Though the initial burden lies with the government
agency to show why information falls within an exemption, now the
requestor also has the burden of showing that the information he
seeks will reveal the activities of the government, thereby satisfying
the central purpose doctrine.'25
3. Manna v. Department of Justice
One of the more exceptional cases under Exemption 7(C) is
Manna v. Department of Justice. Manna was a "consigliere" to the
Genovese organized crime family in New Jersey.' 26  During this
case, Manna was incarcerated for murder, RICO violations, and other
mafia-related crimes. 127 He requested under the FOIA all
government documents referring to him, to be able to use them to
help clear his name. 128 The district court denied the request, and the
Third Circuit affirmed. 129  Manna argued that releasing the
documents to him would aide the criminal justice system by bringing
to light the government's misconduct in Manna's prosecution. 30 The
court rejected this argument - the public interest would never be
served, only that of Manna."'3 Secondly, there was no public interest
in releasing to Manna, a mobster, interviews and other documents
with identifying information of those who aided in his prosecution. 132
The Third Circuit majority panel also stated that the allegations
Manna raised of government misconduct were hypothetical and
unfounded. 133 Before Manna could receive any documents, he would
first have to show that the government had been acting in the
125. Beall, supra note 104, at 1261. See also U.S. Dept of Def, 510 U.S. at
506 (Ginsburg J., concurring).
126. Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1161 (3d Cir. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Beall, supra note 104, at 1268-69.
130. Manna, 51 F.3d at 1161.
131. Id. at 1166 (citing Manna v. US. Dep't of Justice, 815 F. Supp. 798,
808-10 (D.N.J. 1993)).
132. Id. at 1165.
133. Id. at 1166.
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wrong.' 34 But naturally, the next question for the court is, "[h]ow
can Manna show that the government is up to no good when he is
denied access to the documents to prove it?" This question, however,
was not answered by the court.
Despite this mystery requirement placed upon the plaintiff by the
court, the panel majority made another interesting decision in this
case. The court took into consideration the identity of the requestor -
something that had been forbidden by former case law.135 Because
Manna's connection with the Mafia was alive and well, the disclosure
of the requested documents placed the lives of government
informants in jeopardy.'3 6 "Although a court does not usually take a
requester's identity into consideration, Manna's position in the
hierarchy of a particularly influential and violent La Cosa Nostra
Family is highly material to the protection of individual privacy...
,,137
This rationale now suggests that, when balancing the public
interest, secondary effects of the disclosure should be taken into
account. The scope of the privacy interest under Exemption 7(C)
seems to have been expanded to third parties. This expanded scope
favors the use of a derivative use standard - showing that, in this
case, the nondisclosure of documents would be better for those
witnesses who testified against Manna. 39 This is especially
important in Exemption 7(C) cases, where the government wants to
protect its witnesses from retaliation. 139 Without this consideration,
criminals would be able to access their criminal records and gather
the identities of government informants. In these cases, the
government's interest in protecting their informants would override
any criminal's desire to get his or her hands on their own law
enforcement documents.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166.
138. Id.
139. Id.
F. The FOIA: Protecting the Privacy Rights of Third Parties
Protection from an unwarranted invasion of privacy not only
extends to the person who is the subject of the information under the
FOIA, but also extends to third parties who could be greatly affected
by the disclosure of that information. 4 ° Katz v. National Archives
supports this statement. In Katz, the plaintiff wanted to obtain
autopsy photographs of President John F. Kennedy for research.
14
Though the main issue for the court was whether the autopsy records
were "agency records," the court, in dicta, also examined the case
under the FOIA.1
42
The court analyzed the photographs under Exemption 6 because
these were "similar files" to medical files.' 43  Though the person
holding the primary privacy interest was dead, the court stated that
the Kennedy family maintained a privacy interest in the disclosure of
the photographs. 144 The court employed the balancing test of public
interest versus privacy interest to determine whether the photographs
could be released under the FOIA.145 Plaintiff argued that the release
of the photographs would not invade any privacy rights because the
photographs would only show bone, osseous, and structure - nothing
graphic. 46 The plaintiff also argued, using experts, that the release
of these photographs would serve the public interest by performing
reconstruction analysis of the x-rays which had never been performed
before. 147  However, National Archives argued that not only does
plaintiff already have access to certain x-rays made available by the
140. Katz v. Nat'l Archives, 862 F. Supp. 476 (D.C.C. 1994).
141. Id. at 478. Plaintiff Katz wanted these photographs to do a
"photoanalysis" of them to assist in his research on the assassination of President
Kennedy. Id. at 483 n.12.
142. Id. at 482-87. The court ultimately decided that the autopsy photographs
were not agency records, because the photographs were given to the Archives
through a deed of gift and that deed governed the access to the records. Id. at 482-
83. The court dismissed plaintiff s claim because it did not have jurisdiction under
the FOIA to hear the case. Id. at 486.
143. Id. at 483.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Archives conceded this point as well. Id.
147. Id.
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Chief of the Archival Program Branch, plaintiff is also requesting x-
rays which show the gun shot wound to the head.148 The release of
these x-rays would then cause agonizing grief to members to the
Kennedy family if the x-rays were released. 149 The court ultimately
decided that the Kennedy family's privacy interest in the photographs
outweighed the public interest."() "[T]here can be no mistaking that
the Kennedy family has been traumatized by the prior publication of
the unauthorized records and that further release of the autopsy
materials will cause additional anguish."'15
The next major case to consider this issue was Accuracy in Media
Inc. v. National Park Service.152 This was an action by the plaintiffs
to compel production of documents made by defendants during the
investigation of Vincent Foster, Jr.'s suicide.1 3  Plaintiffs FOIA
requests were ultimately denied.154 After plaintiff filed suit in court
to compel production, defendant released 91 pages of material to
plaintiff.155  A month later, the Office of Independent Counsel
released its report on the death of Foster concluding that Foster did in
fact commit suicide. 156 More than a year later, the National Park
Service (NPS) released another 377 pages of information to plaintiff,
193 pages were released in their entirety while the other 184 were
148. Id. at 483-84.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 485-86.
151. Id. at 485.
152. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., No. 97-2109, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18373 (D.C. Nov. 13, 1998).
153. Id. at *3-4. Plaintiff requested documents relating to: (1) the
investigation by the defendant into Foster's death; (2) the decision by the defendant
to rule the death a suicide; (3) communications between the National Park Service
(NPS) and other law enforcement authorities; (4) communications between NPS
and the FBI, White House, and Secret Service about the discovery of Foster's body,
and; (5) interviews of NPS officers by the FBI and United States Senate and House
of Representatives. Id. See infra notes 175-2 10 for the facts of this case.
154. Id. at * 4.
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id. at *5.
released in redacted form.157 Then another fifteen pages were
released by the OIC to plaintiff.'58
Only eleven pages of information regarding the investigation of
Foster's death had been withheld from the plaintiff. 5 9  The NPS
identified the redacted or missing information as "witness interview
notes," "[d]escription of evidence regarding events that took place
following the death of Mr. Foster," and "[i]nvestigatory activities
regarding events that took place after the death of Mr. Foster.' 60 In
addition, the NPS also withheld autopsy photographs of Foster after
conducting an Exemption 7(C) balancing test.' 61
Regarding the autopsy photographs, the district court maintained
that the family of Vincent Foster does hold a privacy interest in those
photographs. 1
62
Although the public has a well-established interest in monitoring
the government's administration of justice, after weighing the Foster
family's significant privacy interest against the potential ability of the
photos to reveal the nature of the fatal wound to Mr. Foster, the court
found that the balance weighed in favor of the Foster family.' 
63
Plaintiff argued that in the suicide investigation there were
several inconsistencies in the paperwork, and by releasing the
photographs the public would benefit by monitoring the government's
administration of justice. 164 The court, however, refused to release
the photographs on that claim and insisted that, by balancing the
157. Id. The NPS felt compelled to release these materials since the report by
the OIC released the names of some of the officers involved in the investigation.
Id. These names had previously been withheld under Exemption 7(C). Id.
158. Id. The autopsy photographs reveal the roof of Foster's mouth, his
tongue, and the exit wound. Id. Plaintiff claimed that the release of these
documents was imperative to determine whether the angle of the exit wound would
show if Foster had committed suicide.
159. Id. Plaintiff originally requested 481 documents. Id.
160. Id. at *5-6. Defendant withheld names, badge information, and other
contact information of law enforcement personnel. Id. at *6.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *13-14.
163. Id. at *14.
164. Id. at *20. Apparently plaintiff was able to show that one report
completed by Dr. Haut, the medical doctor who examined Foster's body, said the
death was "mouth-head," but then on page two of the report, the wound was said to
be "mouth to neck". Id. at *21 n.4.
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privacy interests of the family against the public interest in
monitoring the government, the family maintained a higher
interest.16
5
After this decision, Accuracy in Media (AIM) appealed the
decision. The D.C. Circuit, however, affirmed the decision of the
lower court.166 Regarding the autopsy photographs, AIM contended
that once Foster died, so did any valid privacy interest in the
photographs.' 67 The court rejected this argument, relying on its prior
decisions. 168 "[D]eath clearly matters, as the deceased by definition
cannot personally suffer the privacy-related injuries that may plague
the living . .. [but the] court must also account for the fact that
certain reputation interests and family-related privacy expectations
survive death."'169  Though AIM argued that this proposition was
merely dicta of the D.C. Circuit, the court explicitly stated that the
fact that family privacy interests survived death was an unequivocal
holding of the circuit.1 71 "AIM cannot deny the powerful sense of
invasion bound to be aroused in close survivors by wanton
publication of gruesome details of death by violence."171
In order for AIM to overcome Exemption 7(C)'s threshold
requirement of showing that the invasion is not "unwarranted," the
court said they must meet the "compelling evidence" test: that the
agency denying the request is involved in illegal activity and access
to the documents in question is necessary to confirm or deny that
evidence.' 72 The court found that AIM failed to meet this threshold
because the inconsistencies within the reports were not enough to
165. Id. at *22.
166. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
167. Id. at 122.
168. Id. at 123, citing to Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d
33-24 (D.C Cir. 1998).
169. Id. (quoting Campbell, 164 F.3d at 33-34 (emphasis in original)).
170. Id.
171. Id. "One has only to think of Lindbergh's rage at the photographer who
pried open the coffin of his kidnapped son to photograph the remains and peddle
the resulting photos." Id.
172. Id. at 124 (citing SafeCard Sen's., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205-06
(3rd Cir. 1990)).
prove any wrong-doing on the government's part.'7 3 "When multiple
agencies and personnel converge on a complex scene and offer their
hurried assessments of details, some variation among all the reports
is hardly so shocking as to suggest illegality or deliberate government
falsification."1 74 The court refused to hold that a few inconsistencies
were enough to disclose the autopsy photographs because there was
no indication that the government was acting in an illegal capacity.
After this ruling, Allan Favish of AIM filed suit in his individual
capacity to have the autopsy photographs released.
III. FACTS
On July 20, 1993, Vincent Foster, Jr., White House Deputy
Counsel, was found dead. 175 A private citizen notified two off-duty
police officers that there was a body in Fort Marcy Park in Northern
Virginia.' 76 The officers called 911 and police and rescue personnel
arrived on the scene and found Foster's body. 177 He was lying on the
ground with a .38 caliber pistol in his right hand and a gunshot
wound to the head. 178
The United States Park Police began the initial investigation into
the cause of death.' 79  The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Senate, the House of Representatives, and Independent Counsels
Robert Fiske and Kenneth Starr also conducted separate
173. Id. at 124. AIM relied on three separate statements concerning the exit
wound. One was made by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr which said that the
exit wound was three inches from the top of the head. The Dr. Haut report was
also internally inconsistent. Finally, there was an FBI report made three days after
the incident which reported no exit wound. Id. The court, however, cannot
account for the last one but insists it was made for "preliminary results" and was
stamped only three days after Foster's body was found. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 120.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 161 (2003).
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investigations.1 80 However, they all reached the same conclusion:
Foster had committed suicide.81'
Despite five different investigations, a private citizen, Allan
Favish, remained unconvinced that Foster had taken his own life.1
8 2
Favish applied under the FOIA to obtain photographs of Foster's
body after the Park Service found him on July 20, 1993.183 But the
Park Service refused to disclose the photographs.' 84 Favish was the
associate counsel for Accuracy in Media (AIM) and thus filed suit on
behalf of AIM against the Park Service in district court to release the
photographs. 185 The district court granted summary judgment against
AIM. AIM appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia the district court was affirmed unanimously.
86
Favish, still not satisfied, filed his own request for the
photographs from Foster's death under the FOIA. 187 He requested
eleven photographs: one showing Foster's eyeglasses and the
remainder showing different parts of Foster's body.' 88 Once again, he
was denied the photographs by the Office of Independent Counsel
(OIC). 189 He then took his case to United States District Court for
the Central District of California to compel production.' 9" The court
first held that the collateral estoppel doctrine, as to the decision by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, did not
preclude Favish from bringing his claim in a personal capacity.' 91
The district court released the photograph of Foster's eyeglasses and
eighteen other color photographs. 192 The court did not release ten
other photos under Exemption 7(C) because the privacy interest of
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. Favish filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
compel production. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000).
Foster's family outweighed public interest.1 93 The court relied on a
Vaughn Index provided by the OIC 194 and said that the privacy
interests of the Foster family would be infringed by releasing the
photographs to the public. 5 The district court informed Favish that
he failed to sufficiently explain how the release of the photographs
would advance any public interest into the investigation of Foster's
death.19
6
Favish appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The court
agreed with the district court that, as a matter of law, personal
privacy interests of the deceased under Exemption 7(C) extend to
familial relationships. 197  The court noted that the FOIA does not
specifically state whose privacy interests are protected.19 8 However,
since the statute says "personal" privacy, on the statute's face it would
seem that only the person who is the subject of the information may
be protected under Exemption 7(C). 199 But the court was unsatisfied
with this interpretation. Relying on two D.C. Circuit cases, the court
found that textual reading of the statute too constricting. 20 0  "What
193. Id.
194. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 541 U.S. at 162; see Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). A Vaughn index identifies each document
withheld, the statutory exemption claimed, and a detailed explanation of how
disclosure of the documents would damage the claimed protected interest. See
Favish, 217 F.3d at 1175. A Vaughn index may include affidavits or other detailed
evidence. Id.
195. Nat'lArchives & Records Admin., 541 U.S. at 162.
196. Id.
197. Favish, 217 F.3d at 1173. The court said:
We hold as a matter of law that the personal privacy in the statutory
exemption extends to the memory of the deceased held by those tied
closely to the deceased by blood or love and therefore that the
expectable invasion of their privacy caused by the release of
records made for law enforcement must be balanced against the
public purpose to be served by disclosure.
Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1173 (citing Katz, 862 F. Supp. at 485); N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA,
920 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Katz was discussed supra notes 132-41.
N.Y. Times Co. involved the release of a tape of the last conversation of the
astronauts onboard the Challenger before it exploded. N.Y Times Co., 920 F.2d at
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the cases point to is a zone of privacy in which a spouse, a parent, a
child, a brother or a sister preserves the memory of the deceased
loved one. To violate that memory is to invade the personality of the
survivor." 20 1 The court ultimately decided to reverse and remand the
case to the district court over Judge Pregerson's dissent.20 2 First, the
Ninth Circuit Court reminded the district court that the FOIA statute
does not require that the requestor be able to show government
misfeasance in order to gain access to materials. 20 3  Second,
according to the Ninth Circuit, the district court erred by only
balancing the family interests against the public interest by using the
Vaughn Index.2 °4 The decision rested on the fact that the OIC
described in affidavits the unreleased photographs as "graphic,
explicit, and extremely upsetting," yet no court had ever seen them to
determine if they were of such nature.2 °5 Though the court noted
that, while it is up to the lower court's discretion to rely solely on
agency affidavits, in this case they were insufficiently detailed.20 6
Thus, the district court was to review the photos in camera and then
balance the Foster family's privacy interest against public interest in
disclosure under Exemption 7(C).207
On remand, the district court ordered the release of five
photographs:
The photograph identified as "3-VF's [Vincent Foster's]
body looking down from the top of berm" must be
released, as the photograph is not so explicit as to
overcome the public interest.
1004. The court held the release of the tape was an unwarranted invasion of
privacy with respect to the family members of the astronauts. Id.
201. Favish, 217 F.3d at 1173.
202. Id. at 1174.
203. Id. at 1172-73 (citing Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir. 1992)).
204. Id. at 1174.
205. Id. The court points out that the one photo of the gun in Foster's hand
was not graphic or explicit, as it had been published in Time Magazine and was
broadcasted on television. Therefore, based on this photo, it is appropriate to have
the remaining nine examined. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
The photograph entitled "5--VF's body-focusing on Rt.
Side of shoulder arm" is again of such a nature as to be
discoverable in that it is not focused in such a manner as to
unnecessarily impact the privacy interests of the family.
The photograph entitled "1 --Right Hand showing gun &
thumb in guard" is discoverable as it may be probative of
the public's right to know.
The photograph entitled "4--VF's body focusing on right
side and arm" is discoverable.
The photograph entitled "5--VF's body-focus on top of
head thru heavy foliage" is discoverable.
20 8
On appeal, after the release of the five photographs, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed in part but required the redaction of photograph 3
with no explanation. 20 9
The OIC appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.210
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court,
reversing and remanding the decision of the Ninth Circuit. In this
issue of first impression for the Court, the only documents at issue
were the four photographs that were ordered released by the Ninth
Circuit to Favish.2 1
The Court first decided that the documents clearly fell within
Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA - "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes., 212 The next issue addressed by the Court
was whether the disclosure of the photographs would reasonably be
208. Nat'lArchives & Records Admin., 541 U.S. at 163-64.
209. Id. at 164.
210. Id. The records and photographs at this point in the case had been
transferred to the National Archives and thus their name has been substituted for
petitioner. However, because all the relevant actions took place before the transfer
on March 23, 2004, the Court referred to the petitioner as OIC within its opinion.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.213
The Court quickly dismissed Favish's argument that the right to
personal privacy is only "the right to control information about
oneself."214 Rather, the Court notes that Congress took great care in
amending the statute to expand the scope of Exemption 7(C) to
"reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy" instead of using the language found in Exemption 6
that "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 215 The Court reasons that Exemption 7(C) was enacted to
place protections on personal, intimate data collected via law
enforcement practices; therefore, this information is more deserving
of protection from access by the ordinary citizen.216
The Court then faces the interpretation of "personal" in the phrase
"personal privacy. '217 In his arguments, Favish contended that
personal privacy is only afforded to the decedent and excludes the
family.218  Once again, the Court rejects his view. Though the
statutory language of § 552 does not indicate whose privacy interests
are protected, the Court was nevertheless reluctant to afford the
privacy only to the decedent.219 In making this decision, the Court
looks to the traditions of culture and case law. "We have little
difficulty, however, in finding in our case law and traditions the right
of family members to direct and control disposition of the body of the
deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased
family member's remains for public purposes." 220  Because he is
deceased, Foster no longer has a privacy right to protect; however,
the Court is more concerned with protecting the rights of his
survivors. "Family members have a personal stake in honoring and
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent Favish, 4).
215. Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 167. ("[W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress' use of the
term 'personal privacy' that it intended to permit family members to assert their
own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under the
common law and in our cultural traditions.").
220. Id.
mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation
that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and
respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once
their own.' '221 In further support of the privacy right held by the
decedent's survivors, the Court relies on past case decisions in tort
law to show that the survivors maintain a viable right to privacy.222
It is the right of privacy of the living which it is
sought to enforce here. That right may in some cases
be itself violated by improperly interfering with the
character or memory of a deceased relative, but it is
the right of the living, and not that of the dead, which
is recognized. A privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person . . . to protect their
feelings, and to prevent a violation of their own rights
in the character and memory of the deceased.
223
Based on past cases and cultural traditions, the Court held that the
statute's protection does extend to family members.224
One of the reasons why the Court did not adopt this position was
fear of what would occur if it adopted the position that Favish
argued.225 Because anyone may make an FOIA request and cannot
be denied based on identity, autopsy photos such as the ones at issue
would be made available for anyone to view.226 As a matter of social
policy, the Court refused to allow child molesters, rapists, and other
violent criminals access to files of their victims. 227 The government
221. Id. at 168.
222. Id. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895); McCambridge v.
Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Ark. 1989); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,
155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930).
223. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin, 541 U.S. at 169 (quoting Schuyler, 42
N.E. at 25).
224. Id. at 170.
225. Id. at 171. Favish's argument rested on the notion that only the decedent
held a privacy interest in these cases.
226. Id. at 172.
227. Id. at 170.
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showed in its case that violent criminals made constant FOIA
requests for information of their victims.
228
After establishing that Exemption 7(C) did apply to family
members, the Court wrestles with the notion of whether the reason
for requesting material should be at issue when an FOIA request is
made.
In the instant case, the Court dismisses the old rule that the reason
for the request is not at issue when a FOIA request is made.229
Rather, if the request touches upon the privacy interests in Exemption
7(C), the requestor must also show why they are requesting the
information.230 The Court was highly concerned with retaining
FOIA's purpose; however, it also delicately balanced this purpose
with the rights of private citizens to be free from exploitation. 23'
In seeking this balance, the Court sets forth a two-prong test to
determine whether the information should be disclosed under
Exemption 7(C).232 First, the citizen must show that the public
interest sought to be advanced is a significant one; this interest must
be more specific than having the information for its own sake.233
Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to advance
that interest. 234 If either prong fails, then the invasion of privacy is
unwarranted.2 35  According to the Court, without this requirement
Exemption 7(C) has little or no force because the requestor need only
satisfy a pleading requirement.236
228. Id. "We find it inconceivable that Congress could have intended a
definition of 'personal privacy' so narrow that it would allow convicted felons to
obtain these materials without limitations at the expense of surviving family
members' personal privacy." Id.
229. Id. at 172.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 173. The Court's concern with placing a higher burden on the
requestor to make a showing that the government is involved with any misfeasance
is due to the fact that once the information is released under FOIA, it is public and
anyone can access it. Id. "There is no mechanism under FOIA for a protective
order allowing only the requestor to see whether the information bears out his
theory, or for proscribing its general dissemination." Id. at 174.
The Court's opinion did not define the nexus or balance between
the public interest and personal privacy.2 37  However, the Court
recognized that, without any standards of what public interest should
be advanced, other courts will be left with no guidelines when
balancing the competing interests.238 The Court states that, under
Exemption 7(C), in cases where photographic images are taken at a
death scene where the individual died under "mysterious
circumstances," the requestor must make a showing that the
investigative agency acted negligently or otherwise improperly in
performance of their duties.239 This is not, however, an easy burden
to prove. The Court held that there is a presumption of legitimacy
accorded to government action; thus, clear evidence is required to
displace this presumption.2 40 The scales tip in favor of the requestor
only after the requestor has made a showing that would warrant a
reasonable person to believe that the government is acting
improperly. However, as the Court noted, "[a]llegations of
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard to disprove.'
241
After being faced with an FOIA Exemption 7(C) case, the Court
has cemented the rule that personal privacy extends to the family
members of the deceased. This holding mirrors that of the D.C.
Circuit court's earlier rulings.242 However, in overturning the Ninth
Circuit ruling, the Supreme Court has now placed a greater burden on
the requestor. By setting out a two-prong test for the lower courts to
follow, the Court has finally created a concrete rule to determine
whether an invasion of privacy is warranted. In a law enforcement
investigation case where the subject of FOIA request is photographic
images, the requestor must make the showing that the government
conducted the investigation with impropriety.
However, this new rule does not completely conform with the
statute. FOIA does not explicitly state that the requestor must make
this showing; rather, it is the government agency that has the burden
237. Id. at 175.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 174. "[T]he requestor must produce evidence that would warrant a
belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have
occurred." Id.
241. Id. at 175. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998)).
242. See e.g., Katz supra note 200 and N. Y. Times supra note 200.
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to show why the information is protected by one of FOIA's nine
exemptions. 243 This ruling is similar to that of Manna,244 where the
Third Circuit placed the burden on the Mafioso to show that the
government had acted improperly during the investigation of his
criminal case. However, the same question remains: How can an
individual show that the government is acting improperly when they
cannot have access to the documents to prove impropriety? The
courts have created a catch-22 for requestors. However, it is clear
from these rulings that the courts are highly concerned with the right
to personal privacy, not only for individuals who are the subject of
the documents, but also for those individuals with familial ties to the
subject.
The balance is not a simple task: both the freedom to information
and the right to privacy are central tenants of democracy. To hold
one higher than another is a difficult decision. In today's world,
where information can be disseminated in the blink of an eye over the
Internet for the entire world to see, the right to privacy becomes even
more important to protect. Families who lose loved ones in tragic
events or suicides, even if the loved one is known by the public,
should not have to go through the torment and anguish of having
their husband, son, or parent's autopsy photographs placed in the
hands of a private citizen only interested in gory details. In this case,
Favish probably maintained a legitimate concern that Foster died
from something other than suicide and that the government may have
tried to cover up foul play. However, under the Court's decision in
this case, a legitimate reason to obtain the information will not
overcome the initial showing by the requestor warranting a
reasonable person to believe that the government was involved in
illegal activities.
V. IMPACT
The Court's ruling in National Archives was a major achievement
for government agencies. In this conservative ruling, the Court has
given government actions a presumption of legitimacy that can only
be rebutted with clear evidence. This new presumption has placed
243. § 552(b)(7)(C).
244. See supra note 134.
another hurdle for the requestor to jump when requesting documents
made during law enforcement proceedings. Post-National Archives,
the requestor is required to make a showing with clear evidence that
the government acted in misfeasance when trying to assert that the
public interest being sought is that the government acted negligently.
This, however, seems to depart from the initial intent behind
FOIA. FOIA's purpose was to be a full disclosure statute; its aim was
to allow private citizens to gain access to government materials to
ensure that the government was acting properly. However, with the
new burden imposed by National Archives on the requestor to show
that the government has been acting poorly, a part of the pro-
disclosure spirit of FOIA has been lost. Congress did not intend for
the citizen to already know if the government was acting improperly;
rather, the documents requested and released would contain the
evidence of the government's conduct.
However, this new requirement will make it much easier for the
courts to determine Exemption 7(C) cases. Without the initial
showing with clear evidence that the government has acted in
misfeasance, the requested documents will not have to be released.
As stated before, this requirement will be hard to overcome. Without
knowledge of the contents within the requested documents, it will be
difficult for the requestor to make that showing with clear evidence
that a reasonable person would believe that the government acted
negligently. The Court seems concerned with keeping not only the
privacy of individuals protected, but also with protecting confidential
information. Law enforcement records contain extremely sensitive
materials that should not be open to public scrutiny. Although one's
privacy interests can never be fully protected because many law
enforcement documents become public record once placed in the
judicial system, the Court's decision seems to heighten the protection
these documents. In Favish, the government had clearly scrutinized
Foster's death extensively with five separate investigations.245 It
appears from the Court's ruling that, once the government has
completed their job properly and released the materials from the
investigation that would not cause harm to the investigation or people
surrounding the investigation, the agency has finished its job.
245. Nat'lArchives & Records Admin., 541 U.S. at 161.
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Additionally, the Court's requirement that the requestor must
show why he is asking for the information is yet another departure
from the intent behind FOIA; however, this too gives even greater
force to the nine exemptions. Once a request under FOIA is made
and it touches upon one of the nine exemptions, then the requestor
must show why the information is being requested. This requirement
may place more strain on the courts. When certain documents are
categorized under one of those nine exemptions, there is the
presumption that the documents should not be released. However,
the court will now have to make subjective decisions over what are
valid and invalid decisions for wanting the information.
The biggest concern for the Favish Court was protecting the
privacy of the families whose relative was the subject of FOIA
request. Post-Favish, innocent third-party individuals are now
recognized as having the same privacy rights as those who are
actually the subject of the law enforcement records. Unfortunately, as
the Court recognizes, there are many potential requestors, such as
convicted felons, rapists, and child molesters that may request law
enforcement files on their victims. Many other people may want to
exploit images such as autopsy photographs for monetary gain. For
reasons such as these, it is of the utmost importance to protect family
members from being abused by private citizens seeking personal
gain.
VI. CONCLUSION
When FOIA was contemplated and enacted, it is doubtful that
Congress accounted for the fact that dissemination of information has
reached such great heights; indeed, it is unlikely that it was even
foreseeable. Today, with television, the Internet, satellite radio, and
cell phones, information is distributed at such a rapid pace that
maintaining one's privacy as to their personal and family life is much
more difficult. Exemption 7(C) has gone through many changes, but
has finally been interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Court's
interpretation is more conservative than that of the original intent
behind FOIA. Though FOIA was enacted to facilitate disclosure of
governmental activities, the Supreme Court ruling in National
Archives will, to a certain extent, hinder disclosure of law
enforcement records. When trying to obtain records under FOIA that
may constitute an invasion of privacy, the requestor must not only
show an attempt to advance a public interest, but must also show
with clear evidence that the government did not act legitimately. The
power of the government agencies over the requestor is great; as the
Court stated, allegations of government misconduct are easy to allege
but hard to disprove. It will be in rare cases that someone will be
able to obtain law enforcement records when trying to prove
government misconduct.
While the Supreme Court has been able protect individuals from
unwarranted invasions of privacy, they may have extinguished some
of the original intent behind FOIA. FOIA was enacted as a
disclosure statute, not as a non-disclosure statute. The extra
requirements imposed upon the requestor by the Supreme Court are
somewhat contrary to the purposes of FOIA, yet the importance of
law enforcement is apparently greater than the private citizen's need
for the information. Innocent victims, family members, and
witnesses will all be afforded greater protection under Exemption
7(C) now.
What was once a simple balancing test of weighing the interests
of the public in knowing the actions of their government against the
personal privacy of individuals has now become an obstacle course
for requestors. However, despite the conservative ruling of the
Court, perhaps it is a message to those who want to interfere in the
personal lives of individuals: a person's right to privacy will trump
public knowledge of government actions.
For the citizens who are still skeptical about the manner in which
Foster died, the Government's investigation surrounding his death
will have to suffice. Most likely the Government reached the right
conclusion and the dissemination of the autopsy photographs would
shed no further light on the matter. Rather, they may have only
caused more pain and suffering to the family. Nevertheless, after the
decision in National Archives, it seems clear to this Court that the
rights of the survivors will trump those of private citizens who seek
protected, personal and intimate information under the Freedom of
Information Act.
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